Hundreds of subdomains from dozens of universities have been hijacked by scammers.
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Finding hijacked subdomains is straightforward. People need only enter site:[university].edu “xxx” or site:[university].edu “porn” for an affected institution, and scores of results will appear. In some cases, the subdomains returned no longer lead to porn sites, but as of Friday morning, many still did.
While it wasn't porn - back in college we had a server that was a collection of everything except porn (it was our one rule). Games, movies, tv show, etc.Reading the headline, I figured this was that the universities determined that about 90% of its traffic consisted of porn downloads by the student body and decided to cut out the middleman and cache it all locally to take the load of the network infrastructure.
When they commission a subdomain such as provost.washu.edu, they create a CNAME record, which assigns a URL to the IP address hosting the subdomain.
When they commission a subdomain such as provost.washu.edu, they create a CNAME record, which assigns a URL to the IP address hosting the subdomain. When the subdomain is eventually decommissioned—something that happens frequently for various reasons—the record is never removed. Scammers like Hazy Hawk then swoop in by registering the expired domain name at the base of the old URL.
It relies on the IP address being a web hosting provider that the attacker can get an account at and say "hey, I'm hosting content for foo.columbia.edu which is totally legit as you can tell because I already set up DNS pointing at you!"If I understand this attack properly, it's not that the attacker can go on a dns registrar and somehow register a subdomain for a root they don't control. Rather, if they see a dangling cname, like foo.columbia.edu=>192.168.3.5, then they just need to somehow put up a machine at that ip address to "highjack" the subdomain. Is that right? I'd be curious how an attacker goes about getting a specific ip address if that is what they're doing
a researcher found recently.
Does the term "DC++" ring any bells?While it wasn't porn - back in college we had a server that was a collection of everything except porn (it was our one rule). Games, movies, tv show, etc.
The university noticed that 99% of the bandwidth in the building was used by that one port in one dorm room.
...they gave us a 10G uplink to the core switch. The number of complaints directed at the university ISP inversely correlated with the rise in use of that server so they hooked us up.
It's also how I got into doing resilient and performant HPC storage as my day job...so it was a huge win.
The more insidious way to exploit this would be to replicate the actual university's website style and formatting, but host misinformation. It would be virtually undetectable unless it goes viral.Finding hijacked subdomains is straightforward. People need only enter site:[university].edu “xxx” or site:[university].edu “porn” for an affected institution, and scores of results will appear.
This is a funny way for me to learn that Wash U is no longer wustl.edu
Indeed it does. This was 20 years ago so we hosted forums and direct downloads from that server, though, so no DC++ for the actual sharing mechanism.Does the term "DC++" ring any bells?
They probably had a gopher. IIRC, it was also on AFS. This was late 80s.Don't feel bad, my alma mater "graduated" to a newer .edu domain name as well.
I still remember in the early 1990's using the ftp site (didn't they also have a gopher server?) at ftp.wustl.edu
When they commission a subdomain such as provost.washu.edu, they create a CNAME record, which assigns a URL to the IP address hosting the subdomain. When the subdomain is eventually decommissioned—something that happens frequently for various reasons—the record is never removed. Scammers like Hazy Hawk then swoop in by registering the expired domain name at the base of the old URL.
Thanks for the clear explanation. I was wondering how on earth the attack could be pulled off the way it was described in the article.I had to read the original article to understand what's actually going on here. This particular attack doesn't actually have anything to do with 'subdomains' as you might understand them and little to do with DNS. It's more like:
Obviously at step 2, the university should have deleted the CNAME / A record. And obviously at step 3 the web hosting provider should not be letting customers claim arbitrary hostnames. But neither lapse feels especially surprising.
- University outsources a web site to some provider like WP or something and creates a DNS record for a .edu host pointing to the outsourced web hosting provider IP address
- TIme passes, university gets bored, and the contract with the outsourced web hosting provider lapses but the CNAME still exists.
- Hacking group comes along, opens a new account with the web hosting provider and claims to be responsible for hosting the CNAME. Hacking group is now able to host web content of their choosing which is accessible via a 'trusted' .edu DNS entry.
Does anyone else feel like this type of attack comes from lack of funding/staffing in IT departments?
I feel that this was an inevitability with all the anti-DEI and staff reduction initiatives at soooooo many businesses; you cannot effectively maintain an IT infrastructure if you keep cutting staff and moving services to the cloud.
Eventually, something is going to fall through the cracks...
Several years ago, Target made that mistake with the 800 number for their wedding registry. The sign up kits provided in the store had a sex line number instead of the wedding registry setup line.This reminds me of a scandal from my undergrad days, when the university I transferred to had a hotline for prospective students and their parents to learn more about what the university had to offer.
The problem was, the hotline was formatted as 1-800-AAA-BBBB, but they sent out a pamphlet reversing two parts of the number to 1-800-BBB-BAAA.
Which, as it turned out, was a totally different kind of hotline, that you might have seen advertised on late-night cable TV.
I had to read the original article to understand what's actually going on here. This particular attack doesn't actually have anything to do with 'subdomains' as you might understand them and little to do with DNS. It's more like:
Obviously at step 2, the university should have deleted the CNAME / A record. And obviously at step 3 the web hosting provider should not be letting customers claim arbitrary hostnames. But neither lapse feels especially surprising.
- University outsources a web site to some provider like WP or something and creates a DNS record for a .edu host pointing to the outsourced web hosting provider IP address
- TIme passes, university gets bored, and the contract with the outsourced web hosting provider lapses but the CNAME still exists.
- Hacking group comes along, opens a new account with the web hosting provider and claims to be responsible for hosting the CNAME. Hacking group is now able to host web content of their choosing which is accessible via a 'trusted' .edu DNS entry.
"Some of the world's most prestigious universities, and also Columbia."A relatively minor faceplant given Columbia's recent terrible track record of bending over to the Trump administration. Embarrassing nonetheless.
AI would give a better explanation. There are sources about how Hazy Hawk works all over the web which I’m sure the companies have hoovered up to regurgitateIt's weird that the technical details of this are so far off in the article and we have to look to the comments for a correct description. Dan Goodin should really know better.
I really hate to have to pull the AI card for everything nowadays, but it's hard not to nurse the suspicion.
This line was a literal spit take on my monitor... this is why I subscribe. chefs kiss"Some of the world's most prestigious universities, and also Columbia."
Thank you. My eyebrows rose at the claim that registrars were allowing scammers to register “base” domain names.I had to read the original article to understand what's actually going on here. This particular attack doesn't actually have anything to do with 'subdomains' as you might understand them and little to do with DNS. It's more like:
Obviously at step 2, the university should have deleted the CNAME / A record. And obviously at step 3 the web hosting provider should not be letting customers claim arbitrary hostnames. But neither lapse feels especially surprising.
- University outsources a web site to some provider like WP or something and creates a DNS record for a .edu host pointing to the outsourced web hosting provider IP address
- TIme passes, university gets bored, and the contract with the outsourced web hosting provider lapses but the CNAME still exists.
- Hacking group comes along, opens a new account with the web hosting provider and claims to be responsible for hosting the CNAME. Hacking group is now able to host web content of their choosing which is accessible via a 'trusted' .edu DNS entry.
Honestly, I think current AIs would have been more accurate. This just feels like someone who doesn't know the underlying system trying to summarize an article without understanding it; the kind of thing I expect from non-tech media (and, increasingly, security articles here.)It's weird that the technical details of this are so far off in the article and we have to look to the comments for a correct description. Dan Goodin should really know better.
I really hate to have to pull the AI card for everything nowadays, but it's hard not to nurse the suspicion.
It's quite an old attack and has always been an issue with branded SaaS. I remember receiving a report for one our own subdomains back in 2020. Some marketing campaign or something pointed to some random webhost and was forgotten about.I had to read the original article to understand what's actually going on here. This particular attack doesn't actually have anything to do with 'subdomains' as you might understand them and little to do with DNS. It's more like:
Obviously at step 2, the university should have deleted the CNAME / A record. And obviously at step 3 the web hosting provider should not be letting customers claim arbitrary hostnames. But neither lapse feels especially surprising.
- University outsources a web site to some provider like WP or something and creates a DNS record for a .edu host pointing to the outsourced web hosting provider IP address
- TIme passes, university gets bored, and the contract with the outsourced web hosting provider lapses but the CNAME still exists.
- Hacking group comes along, opens a new account with the web hosting provider and claims to be responsible for hosting the CNAME. Hacking group is now able to host web content of their choosing which is accessible via a 'trusted' .edu DNS entry.
Who is shocked that this could happen in today's "anti-DEI, anti-Immigrant, & pro-free-speech" society?
Porn must be a lesser concern to our Conservative Over-Lords...
I used to work for UCSF. Trust me when I say, a good percentage of their IT folks lack actual skills necessary/required to protect the organization from security holes and breaches. They would rather further their skills in office politics instead. They would rather have Drupal show offs than actual developers who can develop tools to mitigate break ins and exploits. The leadership is stupid therefore so are the employees. They deserve what they get.It's quite an old attack and has always been an issue with branded SaaS. I remember receiving a report for one our own subdomains back in 2020. Some marketing campaign or something pointed to some random webhost and was forgotten about.
There's a related attack where the account expires at a DNS host but the NS records still point to the DNS host and someone can go setup a new account at the DNS hosting service and assume control of the domain.
I'm sure that contributes to the problem, but at universities, the number of domains and servers can get pretty wild. And even in a fully staffed department, it's rare that anyone is tasked with either tracking or cleaning up dead registry entries. To a large extent, universities are an IT nightmare because you have a whole host of people who know enough to set stuff up on their own, but don't know enough to tell someone when they pull the plug.