The authors of this exploit actually went "full-disclosure" six months ago when they first published the API, saying there was an easy way to associate account names back to phone numbers without telling how. The difference here (aside from adding support for the useless new "privacy" settings) is that they wrote a sample script to do it, but it's really only one obvious step that anyone could have seen. With botnets, even rate-limiting probably wouldn't be useful.
By now someone has probably already cataloged the entire area codes of all the big cities. I wonder how 212 compares to 503 or 405, for instance?
Their home-grown manner of creating an auth key is baffling, when tools like bcrypt and scrypt already exist. I'm sure that it'd be nearly impossible to reverse-engineer from a black box, but one quick disassembly of the client that's freely handed out and the whole algorithm is right there. A good example of putting security effort into solving the wrong problem.