There are reasons for having it go off for more than just tornados and nuclear weapons. In the recent storms, a few of the rural areas outside DFW had sirens going off for baseball-sized hail. If it's going off for mild rain, though, that's definitely going to make people ignore them.Do people not know how fast tornados can come up? They can occur at the edge of "here is good weather, there is bad weather". You only get a few minutes lead time on tornados and the sirens aren't "we think there might be tornados somewhere" they are "there is an active tornado" alerts.
If the siren goes off don't look around if it's legit.
Depends on the area. I live in a suburb of Oklahoma City and for some idiotic reason here they blow the sirens when it rains. Its so bad most residents here just ignore the sirens and assume we're fine because we are 25 miles away from Moore...
Also dumb way to die 1001 'figuring a siren is a malfunction when a nuclear fallout could be avoided by simply walking down the block.' It seriously has to end somewhere. Make sure the emergency is real by trying to gather information and take action, or just plain take action to be safe. Your life is worth it FFS!
"I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
We know from the 9-11 calls that a number of people were concerned enough to use the emergency service to try and obtain answers. That actually made things worse for people that really needed police, fire, or ambulance.
In Dallas, most people knew that the weather was fine, so why not continue watching Netflix? If the only other option is nuclear attack -- panic (or duck and cover) does nothing. Unless you have a well stocked bunker you should just continue on like there isn't a problem.
There are reasons for having it go off for more than just tornados and nuclear weapons. In the recent storms, a few of the rural areas outside DFW had sirens going off for baseball-sized hail. If it's going off for mild rain, though, that's definitely going to make people ignore them.Do people not know how fast tornados can come up? They can occur at the edge of "here is good weather, there is bad weather". You only get a few minutes lead time on tornados and the sirens aren't "we think there might be tornados somewhere" they are "there is an active tornado" alerts.
If the siren goes off don't look around if it's legit.
Depends on the area. I live in a suburb of Oklahoma City and for some idiotic reason here they blow the sirens when it rains. Its so bad most residents here just ignore the sirens and assume we're fine because we are 25 miles away from Moore...
I'd imagine most people have enough sense to look out the window, see the lack of severe weather, and figure the sirens must be going off for a darn good reason."I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
We know from the 9-11 calls that a number of people were concerned enough to use the emergency service to try and obtain answers. That actually made things worse for people that really needed police, fire, or ambulance.
In Dallas, most people knew that the weather was fine, so why not continue watching Netflix? If the only other option is nuclear attack -- panic (or duck and cover) does nothing. Unless you have a well stocked bunker you should just continue on like there isn't a problem.
especially since they kept going off for 90 minutes.I'd imagine most people have enough sense to look out the window, see the lack of severe weather, and figure the sirens must be going off for a darn good reason."I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
We know from the 9-11 calls that a number of people were concerned enough to use the emergency service to try and obtain answers. That actually made things worse for people that really needed police, fire, or ambulance.
In Dallas, most people knew that the weather was fine, so why not continue watching Netflix? If the only other option is nuclear attack -- panic (or duck and cover) does nothing. Unless you have a well stocked bunker you should just continue on like there isn't a problem.
I used to work on Whelen systems many moons ago. If I recall correctly, the DTMF command has to be preceded by a PL (privacy code) or siren address to activate the siren stack and tell it that commands follow. Unless all of the sirens had the same access code...but that would be...inconceivable. No one would be that dumb...right?
While obviously not a good long term solution, it is a routinely employed short-term solution."I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
Lol, security through obscurity.
Get this:
https://www.amazon.com/RTL-SDR-Blog-RTL ... ywords=sdr
Install SDR#:
http://airspy.com/download/
And see for yourself just how many unsecured signals are out there (for SCADA look on 900-990 MHz and around 150 -155 MHz). You'll need to do some more trickery to decode the digital signals, but it isn't that hard.
Edit: that SDR is receive only.
"I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
Lol, security through obscurity.
Systems being insecure, sadly don't surprise me anymore.
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
Get this:
https://www.amazon.com/RTL-SDR-Blog-RTL ... ywords=sdr
Install SDR#:
http://airspy.com/download/
And see for yourself just how many unsecured signals are out there (for SCADA look on 900-990 MHz and around 150 -155 MHz). You'll need to do some more trickery to decode the digital signals, but it isn't that hard.
Edit: that SDR is receive only.
Yes! for only $25 USD you too can receive radio transmissions intended for safety and public security! Know what Big Bother talks about behind your back! Fool your friends! Fun at parties!
"I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
Lol, security through obscurity.
Systems being insecure, sadly don't surprise me anymore.
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
All of this is just more proof that we need to take every single analog system of any sort, remaining and tear them down, plow them into the dirt, and replace them with secure digital, IP-based systems.
People here criticize me for being a 'kid' who doesn't like old technology. But what you are seeing here are the real costs of it. We've moved beyond analog technology just like we've moved on from unpasteurized milk and bloodletting as a cure for disease.
This system should be torn down and replaced with something SMS, wireless IP, or social media based, to have far reaching and high-information-density capabilities that can reach anyone anywhere at anytime through connected devices the great majority, or at least the families of the great majority, carry with them all the time.
"I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
Lol, security through obscurity.
Systems being insecure, sadly don't surprise me anymore.
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
I used to work on Whelen systems many moons ago. If I recall correctly, the DTMF command has to be preceded by a PL (privacy code) or siren address to activate the siren stack and tell it that commands follow. Unless all of the sirens had the same access code...but that would be...inconceivable. No one would be that dumb...right?
1, 2, 3, 4, 5? That's amazing! I've got the same combination on my luggage!
While obviously not a good long term solution, it is a routinely employed short-term solution."I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
Lol, security through obscurity.
Take Google's Project Zero, for example. When they find an exploit in somebody's software, they give them 90 days to fix it before they make it public. I don't see how this is any different. Until you've fixed the vulnerability, you don't want people to know what it was. Even though in this case clearly somebody in the wild already knows, you don't want to help spread that information until you've closed the barn door.
I used to work on Whelen systems many moons ago. If I recall correctly, the DTMF command has to be preceded by a PL (privacy code) or siren address to activate the siren stack and tell it that commands follow. Unless all of the sirens had the same access code...but that would be...inconceivable. No one would be that dumb...right?
1, 2, 3, 4, 5? That's amazing! I've got the same combination on my luggage!
Old school phone phreaking is exactly what I thought of.This is some old-school analog phone phreaker handywork. It's both reassuring and terrifying to know the old ways aren't dead yet.
Anyone want to bet they put PL or DPL on the receiver?![]()
This sounds like yet another system that could be secured by an asymmetric key challenge-response system. The operator of the alert network has a private key, and all the alarms have the corresponding public key. The operator sends out a message that the alarms should turn on. Each alarm sends back a block of random bits, and the operator responds by signing and rebroadcasting each random block. The alarms verify the signatures with the public key and then turn on.
Now that I think of it, there might be a way to skip the challenge and response if the operator sends out the random bits first.
[url=https://arstechnica.co.uk/civis/viewtopic.php?p=33148193#p33148193:3oytv6pw said:Dilbert[/url]":3oytv6pw]Get this:
https://www.amazon.com/RTL-SDR-Blog-RTL ... ywords=sdr
Install SDR#:
http://airspy.com/download/
And see for yourself just how many unsecured signals are out there (for SCADA look on 900-990 MHz and around 150 -155 MHz). You'll need to do some more trickery to decode the digital signals, but it isn't that hard.
Edit: that SDR is receive only.
[url=https://arstechnica.co.uk/civis/viewtopic.php?p=33149369#p33149369:28ejme0c said:astarre[/url]":28ejme0c]I used to work on Whelen systems many moons ago. If I recall correctly, the DTMF command has to be preceded by a PL (privacy code) or siren address to activate the siren stack and tell it that commands follow. Unless all of the sirens had the same access code...but that would be...inconceivable. No one would be that dumb...right?
[url=https://arstechnica.co.uk/civis/viewtopic.php?p=33151829#p33151829:2yhpgrf2 said:robbkcmo1970[/url]":2yhpgrf2]As a teen I worked for my local police in my small town - they also controlled the Emergency Management functions in our city and county (just fyi, small area in Missouri). We "activated" the sirens via a dial-phone code which sent an OTA tone via a certain frequency.
Watching the ridiculous news coverage the past few days, I kept telling friends/family that there was no "computer hack." It was, instead, an analog/digital radio hack. People with FCC Amateur Radio Licenses have easy access to these frequencies and tones, and agree, as part of his/her FCC license, not to ever do anything to cause a panic. That means whatever info we learn, we don't share and won't take advantage of, period.
This isn't a common HAM. S/he is instead interested in creating panic. Generically some call that a "hacker." I define a hacker as someone who infiltrates a computer-directed system in an effort to hurt people.
This person found out the frequency and tone to turn on the sirens. Not hacking. Just using info to set them off. An asshole, a guy who should be prosecuted, yes. But not hacking.
I used to work on Whelen systems many moons ago. If I recall correctly, the DTMF command has to be preceded by a PL (privacy code) or siren address to activate the siren stack and tell it that commands follow. Unless all of the sirens had the same access code...but that would be...inconceivable. No one would be that dumb...right?
1, 2, 3, 4, 5? That's amazing! I've got the same combination on my luggage!
No, the security is military grade, same as used for nuclear weapons.
The code is: 000000
Now, I have to kill you...
moneySo question for anyone who actually works with these systems.
I realize that many of these are decades old systems which were designed in a 'simpler' era by non-paranoid engineers who weren't thinking (despite you know, the Cold War, paranoia over Communist spies, and etc.) about malicious actors.
But why aren't these systems retrofitted to be hardened more often?
"I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
We know from the 9-11 calls that a number of people were concerned enough to use the emergency service to try and obtain answers. That actually made things worse for people that really needed police, fire, or ambulance.
In Dallas, most people knew that the weather was fine, so why not continue watching Netflix? If the only other option is nuclear attack -- panic (or duck and cover) does nothing. Unless you have a well stocked bunker you should just continue on like there isn't a problem.
"I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
We know from the 9-11 calls that a number of people were concerned enough to use the emergency service to try and obtain answers. That actually made things worse for people that really needed police, fire, or ambulance.
In Dallas, most people knew that the weather was fine, so why not continue watching Netflix? If the only other option is nuclear attack -- panic (or duck and cover) does nothing. Unless you have a well stocked bunker you should just continue on like there isn't a problem.
By now I suspect that people in Texas are aware that industrial incidents at chemical plants/refineries are a potential disaster. Depending on the nature of the event you may either need to shelter in place or run like hell*.
*I actually know people in the reactive chemical industry who routinely call it the "RLH protocol."
Nice. They probably also have an industrial variant of Maxims 2† and 3‡?*I actually know people in the reactive chemical industry who routinely call it the "RLH protocol."
"I don't want someone to understand how it was done so that they could try to do it again"
What interests me is whether people actually cared about the alarm?
I suspect most carried on watching Netflix in the face of impending doom?
We know from the 9-11 calls that a number of people were concerned enough to use the emergency service to try and obtain answers. That actually made things worse for people that really needed police, fire, or ambulance.
In Dallas, most people knew that the weather was fine, so why not continue watching Netflix? If the only other option is nuclear attack -- panic (or duck and cover) does nothing. Unless you have a well stocked bunker you should just continue on like there isn't a problem.
By now I suspect that people in Texas are aware that industrial incidents at chemical plants/refineries are a potential disaster. Depending on the nature of the event you may either need to shelter in place or run like hell*.
*I actually know people in the reactive chemical industry who routinely call it the "RLH protocol."
2. A Sergeant in motion outranks a Lieutenant who doesn't know what's going on.
3. An ordnance technician at a dead run outranks everybody.
Nice. They probably also have an industrial variant of Maxims 2† and 3‡?*I actually know people in the reactive chemical industry who routinely call it the "RLH protocol."
†2. A Sergeant in motion outranks a Lieutenant who doesn't know what's going on.
‡3. An ordnance technician at a dead run outranks everybody.