—exclude-newer is right there in modern package managers? How are we supposed to trust them to protect us from supply-chain attacks when they themselves are a weak link in our supply chain?https://community.bitwarden.com/t/bitwarden-statement-on-checkmarx-supply-chain-incident/96127Zero clarity on the Bitwarden situation from this article. I wish there had been some kind of impact reporting there ? Why even mention them if you’re not going to talk about it
Many thanks for posting that here!https://community.bitwarden.com/t/bitwarden-statement-on-checkmarx-supply-chain-incident/96127
"If you use the Bitwarden command line interface and deploy using NPM, and downloaded the CLI between 5:57p ET and 7:30p ET on April 22, 2026, you may be affected."
Pretty narrow window and limited audience.
I think this is an important detail that the article missed. Regarding this attack, Bitwarden was engaging with Redditors and actively raising awareness.https://community.bitwarden.com/t/bitwarden-statement-on-checkmarx-supply-chain-incident/96127
"If you use the Bitwarden command line interface and deploy using NPM, and downloaded the CLI between 5:57p ET and 7:30p ET on April 22, 2026, you may be affected."
Pretty narrow window and limited audience.
The information definitely should have been included in the article instead of letting people think that all of Bitwarden was attacked or compromised.Many thanks for posting that here!
Yeah, it comes across as clickbait when no relevant details are included. Thanks to LlamaDragon for actually sharing helpful information.Zero clarity on the Bitwarden situation from this article. I wish there had been some kind of impact reporting there ? Why even mention them if you’re not going to talk about it
Hi can you elaborate on this? I think having a cool down period of new packages from supposedly trustworthy suppliers is the answer to protect against the eventual 4 or 8 hour compromise window.Not a great look for Checkmarx or Trivy. You’re telling me they don’t have mitigations for watering-hole attacks? When—exclude-neweris right there in modern package managers? How are we supposed to trust them to protect us from supply-chain attacks when they themselves are a weak link in our supply chain?
Not a great look for Checkmarx or Trivy. You’re telling me they don’t have mitigations for watering-hole attacks? When—exclude-neweris right there in modern package managers? How are we supposed to trust them to protect us from supply-chain attacks when they themselves are a weak link in our supply chain?
Look, I don't know any other way to sanitize a numeric input than to pull in 387 dependencies.Ahh, npm. The gift that keeps on giving.
Surely you mean a nightmare of pointless box-checkmarxing.Would be very happy to see the end of checkmarx use in our company. The implementation is a nightmare of pointless box-ticking and approvals to get any issue it raises closed. The vast majority are false positives.
What's worse, if you change a file such that the line of code it flagged changes (e.g adding something new before) - the same issue gets raised again.