Interesting article, but it fails to make one key argument:
While it does point out some serious shortcommings in the RN decisionmaking, it doesn't actually argue how the CVA01 cancellation and the decision to forego the Shangri La lease negatively affected the UK. Going forward with either
might have forced some changes on the RN as ancillary measure, but the possible potential for a side benefit doesn't make for a compelling argument.
Unlike France, which remained much more involved in Francafrique than the UK did in British Africa and hence had a use-case for power projection in the South Atlantic, the only real use-case the British had for a "proper CATOBAR carrier" lay east of Suez, and British policy already favoured the disengagement from South-East Asia for reasons entirely unrelated to carrier aviation. Without an independent-from-the-US[0] naval deployment in SEA those ships would've been hulls looking for a purpose.
However, Britain's finances weren't the best at the time, so from an economic perspective Britain would've needed non-US partners. There were two choices available, at that time, both revolving around aligning foreign and economic policy with each other:
0) European foreign policy alignment by pursuing reproachment with France and mend fences with the Gaulists to create a stronger European block within NATO (path not taken), and economic foreign policy alignment with the EC (path eventually taken, after being delayed by de Gaule for a decade because of bad blood)
1) Overseas foreign policy alignment by orienting yourself with powers outside of Europe (path taken), and continuing to value overseas economic ties with the Commonwealth over European economic integration (path not taken)
The UK chose to not align economic and foreign policy.
By choosing to align its foreign policy to the US, it prevented the creation of European partnerships. A French/Dutch/British cooperation that was directly with each other instead of each of them being a defacto solitary partner to the US through NATO could've created composite navy perhaps capable enough to perform significant independent long range deployments to SEA. Furthermore the existence of such a block may have spurred Germany into a naval interest beyond purely European waters -- tho it is understandable that at that time the news of 'renewed German naval interest' may not have been entirely welcome in London. In such a context, having your own 'proper' carriers would've made sense.
By choosing to align itself economically with the European Community and throwing Australia and the rest of the Commonwealth under the bus, it robbed itself of local allies. Had it not done so, the carriers could've provided the nucleus of a composite navy this time fleshed out by local SEA partners and bases.
The conclusion of this is that the UK robbed itself to do anything useful with those large carriers, through choices unrelated to the carriers or even the RN in general, and hence not building them was an entirely cromulent course of action.
[0] If you accept dependence on the US for naval aviation then the choice to focus on supplementing the US Navy in ASW warfare is an entirely rational choice, by allowing you to focus on one task you can get reasonably good at without diverting funds into a program you can't afford on your own anyway.
